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OPEN LETTER ON ETHICAL NORMS IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY SCHOLARSHIP1
Robin Feldman, Mark A. Lemley, Jonathan S. Masur & Arti K. Rai
As intellectual property (“IP”) scholars, we write this letter with
aspirations of reaching the highest ethical norms possible for our field.
Changes in the field of IP make it incumbent upon us to look inward,
examine our current practices, and begin to frame norms that we hope
can apply across the field of legal academia.
We have noted an influx of large contributions from corporate
and private actors who have an economic stake in ongoing policy debates in the field. Research funding has increased as IP issues have
become more salient in both the political and business realms. And it
has coincided with a decline in university funding for basic academic
research. Some dollars come with strings attached, such as the ability
to see or approve academic work prior to publication or limitations on
the release of data. Some dollars simply arrive as donations to IP programs or centers, or in the form of travel grants and other attractive
gifts.
At the same time, IP scholars have become more engaged in policy advocacy, the writing of amicus briefs, and the practice of law. In
general, we think this is a salutary development. Courts regularly
complain about scholarship being unconnected to the real world,2 and
law students worry that they are not being trained to succeed in practice.3 Greater engagement between scholars and the world of practice
can help solve both problems and can also bring a thoughtful, more
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2. See, e.g., Brent Newton, Scholar’s Highlight: Law Review Articles in the Eyes of the
Justices,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Apr.
30,
2012,
12:15
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/04/scholar%E2%80%99s-highlight-law-review-articlesin-the-eyes-of-the-justices/ [http://perma.cc/CDA7-K3GB] (citing the derogatory comments
three Supreme Court Justices made about law review articles).
3. See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 135–59 (2012).
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unbiased perspective to legislative and judicial debates traditionally
dominated by interested parties. At the same time, however, IP scholars who are also engaged in practice or advocacy must struggle to
keep their academic and advocacy roles separate.
We cannot imagine that any academic believes that his or her
judgment is subject to purchase. Nevertheless, the flow of dollars can
have an insidious effect on values scholars hold dear in academia. We
have seen evidence in other fields that researchers who receive gifts
and support can have an uncanny tendency to find results that would
please their benefactors.4 One must be mindful of the delicate pull of
friends with money.
Funding can have other subtle effects on academic discourse. In
the highest tradition of academic inquiry, scholars should strive to be
open to the comments, suggestions, and views of others — learning
from colleagues in the field and modifying their inclinations as they
hear persuasive arguments. As a community, scholars benefit from
constant effort to shape and improve each other’s thinking, and such
effort makes the entire field intellectually stronger and more valuable.
We worry that an influx of money paid to those who take certain positions can cause people to become locked into those positions rather
than being open to academic discussion and allowing one’s perspective to evolve as part of that discourse. In the long term, the influx of
money has the potential to create polarization in the field, creating a
situation in which different sides speak only to those with similar perspectives. Such a result could seriously weaken the potential for
scholars to strengthen their work by subjecting it to critique and taking seriously the scrutiny it receives.
Finally, we are mindful of the need to protect the role of the academic as a trusted source of reliable information for policymakers and
society at large. The issues described above run the risk of creating
the impression in the minds of the public that academics are lobbyists
rather than scholars — with the accompanying loss of trust.
We do not intend to be critical of any individual academic or the
field as a whole. It would be improper to criticize scholars for violating ethical norms when no such norms exist across legal academia.
Rather, our goal is to bring attention to the dramatic changes that are
occurring in the field, highlight potential pitfalls, and suggest a set of
ethical norms to which we will strive to adhere.
IP law is not the first field to encounter these problems. In fact,
legal academics are well behind the curve in grappling with the implication of these issues and establishing uniform guidelines. Studies of
research in the field of medicine have long identified concerns about
4
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the connection between sponsorship and results.5 For example, a 2003
study in the Journal of the American Medical Association (“JAMA”)
concluded that “industry-sponsored research tends to draw proindustry conclusions.”6 In a meta-analysis7 of eight articles addressing
the issue of industry-sponsored research, which together had themselves covered more than eleven hundred original medical research
studies, Bekelman et al. found that industry-sponsored trials were 3.6
times more likely to reach conclusions favorable to industry than
those without industry sponsorship.8 In addition to more positive outcomes, the articles also raised concerns about subtle judgment issues
in the design of the sponsored medical trials that could influence results.9
Direct sponsorship of research is not the only cause of concern.
Studies have concluded that other types of financial ties besides direct
sponsorship can have an effect on results. For example, a 1998 study
published in the New England Journal of Medicine examined sixtynine articles related to a particular type of pharmaceutical.10 The study
showed that authors whose research supported the use of the pharmaceutical were significantly more likely to have financial relationships
with the manufacturers than those who were neutral or critical.11

5. See generally, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance: Clinical Investigators and
the Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539 (2000); Drummond Rennie,
Thyroid Storm, 277 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1238 (1997); Justin Gillis, A Hospital’s Conflict of
Interest,
WASH.
POST
(June
30,
2002),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/06/30/a-hospitals-conflict-ofinterest/22bf0db8-e014-4f57-bece-f0998d394396/ [http://perma.cc/66LR-6JB4]; Philip J.
Hilts, Company Tried To Block Report That Its H.I.V. Vaccine Failed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1,
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/01/us/company-tried-to-block-report-that-its-hivvaccine-failed.html [http://perma.cc/9S2F-T75F]; Duff Wilson & David Heath, Uninformed
Consent,
SEATTLE
TIMES,
http://old.seattletimes.com/uninformed_consent/
[http://perma.cc/FRR4-VEPK].
6. Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 454, 463 (2003).
7. A meta-analysis is one that “thoroughly examine[s] a number of valid studies on a topic and mathematically combine[s] the results using accepted statistical methodology to
report the results as if it were one large study.” Introduction to Evidence-Based Practice:
Types
of
Studies,
DUKE
U.
MED.
CTR.
LIBR.
&
ARCHIVES,
http://guides.mclibrary.duke.edu/c.php?g=158201&p=1036068
[http://perma.cc/KH86F3PX] (last updated Jan. 19, 2016, 2:57 PM).
8. See Bekelman et al., supra note 6, at 456; Peter Whoriskey, As Drug Industry’s Influence over Research Grows, So Does the Potential for Bias, WASH. POST (Nov. 24, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/as-drug-industrys-influence-overresearch-grows-so-does-the-potential-for-bias/2012/11/24/bb64d596-1264-11e2-be82c3411b7680a9_story.html [http://perma.cc/24H8-GDRL] (describing the JAMA study and
its main finding).
9. See Bekelman et al., supra note 6, at 456, 459; Whoriskey, supra note 8.
10. Henry Thomas Stelfox et al., Conflict of Interest in the Debate over Calcium-Channel
Antagonists, 338 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 101, 103 (1998).
11. Id.
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As concerns have increased about financial ties outside of direct
sponsorship of research, studies have increasingly focused on unveiling additional financial conflicts of interests that subtly influence physician practice. For example, a recent analysis by Robertson et al.
summarized several studies on the effects of pharmaceutical industry
gifts in the form of paid travel and accommodation, food and beverages, sponsorship for continuing medical education, as well as free
tickets to cultural and sporting events.12 Robertson et al. tracked
changes in prescribing behavior after physicians received such benefits. Notably, physicians who received money for continuing medical
education insisted that such funding would not influence their medical
practice.13 Despite this conviction, post-sponsorship prescribing patterns shifted toward endorsement of the sponsoring pharmaceutical
brands.14
Concerned that public trust in medical research could be seriously
eroded,15 the medical research field has engaged in reviews of its own
policies that have led to revisions of various ethical rules. Many, although not all, highly respected medical journals now require authors
to submit extensive financial contribution reports along with their articles.16 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(“PhRMA”), which represents biopharmaceutical research companies,
introduced a Code of Ethics designed to limit the pharmaceuticalphysician relationship.17 Moreover, the Affordable Care Act (2010),
in order to increase transparency, requires pharmaceutical companies
to report financial gifts to physicians, even low-value purchases, such
as lunch.18 ProPublica, a public interest, investigative journalism non-

12. Christopher Robertson et al., Effect of Financial Relationships on the Behaviors of
Health Care Professionals: A Review of the Evidence, 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 452, 459–61
(2012).
13. Id. at 461 (citing M.A. Bowman & D.L. Pearle, Changes in Drug Prescribing Patterns Related to Commercial Company Funding of Continuing Medical Education, 8 J.
CONTINUING EDUC. HEALTH PROFS. 13 (1988)).
14. Id.
15. Bekelman et al., supra note 6, at 455. See generally Jordan J. Cohen, Trust Us To
Make a Difference: Ensuring Public Confidence in the Integrity of Clinical Research, 76
ACAD. MED. 209 (2001); Donna Shalala, Protecting Research Subjects — What Must Be
Done, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 808 (2000).
16. See generally, e.g., George D. Lundberg & Annette Flanagin, New Requirements for
Authors: Signed Statements of Authorship Responsibility and Financial Disclosure, 262 J.
AM. MED. ASS’N 2003 (1989); Author Responsibilities — Conflicts of Interest, INT’L
COMMITTEE MED. J. EDITORS, http://www.icmje.org/recommendations/browse/roles-andresponsibilities/author-responsibilities--conflicts-of-interest.html
[http://perma.cc/YP7YHRSU].
17. See PHRMA, CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS (2008),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/phrma_marketing_code_2008.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ZKN4-VM88].
18. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7h(a)(1) (2012).
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profit, compiles and publishes this data on its website.19 In general,
academics in the medical field have organized policies and implemented standards that aim to preserve the academy’s integrity, objectivity, and ultimately, its ability to convey important findings.
Objectivity is a general scholarly goal that applies throughout all
fields of research, even beyond pharmaceuticals. A 2015 New York
Times article described controversy surrounding Coca-Cola’s work
with scientists to promote the conclusion that solutions to the nation’s
obesity problem should focus on exercise, rather than reducing caloric
intake.20 The press report noted that the company, which would benefit considerably from any shift away from efforts to reduce consumption of sugary drinks, had partnered with respected scientists to
promote this message through medical journals, conferences, and social media, including funding a nonprofit organization to advance the
campaign.21 In the field of economics, a British study examined the
financial affiliations of prominent academic financial economists who
were associated with groups proposing financial reforms in the wake
of the 2008 financial crisis.22 The study found that while the academic
economists frequently had private affiliations with the potential to
raise conflicts of interest issues, the economists disclosed those affiliations infrequently and inconsistently.23 Similarly, in September
2015, the New York Times published an article describing troubling
ties between academics and industry on both sides of the debate concerning genetically modified crops.24 The article described corporations providing what it termed “special ‘unrestricted grants’” to
academics.25 It also suggested that companies had paid for academics
to make lobbying trips to Capitol Hill and had published articles under
the names of prominent academics — articles that were, in some cases, drafted by industry consultants rather than the scholars.26
19. See Lena Groeger et al., Dollars for Docs: How Industry Dollars Reach Your Doctors,
PROPUBLICA
(July
1,
2015),
https://projects.propublica.org/docdollars/
[http://perma.cc/A5H7-9QQ5].
20. Anahad O’Connor, Coca-Cola Funds Scientists Who Shift Blame for Obesity Away
from
Bad
Diets,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
9,
2015),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/coca-cola-funds-scientists-who-shift-blame-forobesity-away-from-bad-diets/?_r=0
[perma.cc/SCW9-Z277].
21. Id.
22. See Jessica Carrick-Hagenbarth & Gerald A. Epstein, Dangerous Interconnectedness:
Economists’ Conflicts of Interest, Ideology and Financial Crisis, 36 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON.
43, 43 (2012).
23. Id. at 44–45.
24. See Eric Lipton, Food Industry Enlisted Academics in G.M.O. Lobbying War, Emails
Show, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/us/food-industryenlisted-academics-in-gmo-lobbying-war-emails-show.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/H8QS-PLXL].
25. Id.
26. Id.
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In the fields of scientific and medical research, journals and government funding sources can serve as important gatekeepers and referees. A peer-reviewed medical journal could, in theory, reject an artiarticle if there is reason to believe that the work is compromised by
financial interests. Even asking about financial interests can lead to a
check on behavior. Thus, if journals require authors to disclose gifts
or financial ties above a certain amount, researchers may be moved to
reject anything above that amount in anticipation of having to answer
the question at the publication gate. Such gatekeepers can also impose
transparency by requiring authors to disclose information in a way
that is accessible and useful.27 Questions and requirements from government funding agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health
(“NIH”) and the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), can have similar effects. Finally, the peer-review process encourages authors to
tone down unsupported claims28 and has the potential to tease out
methodological concerns. Although serious criticism and debate remain over the effectiveness of these ethical rules, peer review supplies
both a mechanism to implement the rules and an awareness of their
importance.
In contrast to medical research, legal research lags well behind,
both in terms of the establishment of ethical codes and methods of
enforcing those codes. The overwhelming majority of legal journals
are not peer-reviewed.29 Rather, the articles are chosen and edited by
law students whose knowledge of methodological flaws and potential
biases may be limited. Law journals generally do not request information on conflicts of interest and do not require disclosure of such
information. Similarly, the legal field lacks organizations, such as the
NIH and NSF, that have either the purse strings or the bully pulpit to
impose meaningful ethical rules. Legal authors may occasionally seek
federal funds to support research, but that is far from the norm. As a
result, it is unsurprising that behavioral norms similar to those in the
scientific fields have yet to emerge.
In some corners, however, conflict of interest rules are beginning
to have an impact on the legal academy. Consider Harvard University’s policy, which was promulgated in response to concern over po-

27. However, offering an avalanche of information, with the relevant piece buried somewhere therein, does not constitute useful disclosure and should be eschewed under ethical
disclosure best practices.
28. See, e.g., Whoriskey, supra note 8 (reporting that New England Journal of Medicine
peer reviewers demanded authors of a study sponsored by pharmaceutical companies to tone
down the safety claims in a report on the drug Avandia).
29. Richard A. Posner, Against the Law Reviews, LEGAL AFF. (Nov.–Dec. 2004), http://
www.legalaffairs.org/issues/November-December-2004/review_posner_novdec04.msp
[perma.cc/485H-LGYK].

No. 2]

Open Letter on Ethical Norms in IP Scholarship

7

tential conflicts of interest at the medical school30 and applies broadly
to all Harvard academics, including legal academics.31 It “requires
public disclosure of all relevant faculty financial interests; prohibits
most gifts from industry; regulates faculty members’ participation in
industry speakers’ bureaus; and restricts industry involvement in continuing medical education.”32 This type of conflict of interest policy
could serve as a model for legal academia and offers a good starting
point for thinking about the issues as they arise in the legal context.
The bias that may result from a financial conflict of interest is, of
course, not the only bias that can affect either legal or scientific results. The pressure to produce publishable results, to say something of
significance that will garner attention, to reevaluate the accepted
norm, or to otherwise approach the data in a way that will lead toward
certain conclusions, can affect any inquiry.33 Moreover, few scholars
would argue that we are ever able to operate in the realm of perfect
objectivity — whether as legal academics or scientists.34 Nevertheless, striving for the greatest objectivity possible is a worthwhile goal,
and creating the transparency that will allow other academic colleagues to press us toward objectivity is essential to that end.35 With
this in mind, we believe that we can borrow from the experience of
medical science to begin building a set of cultural and ethical norms
for IP scholars.
In addition to transparency about financial conflicts of interest,
the medical and life science communities have also had to confront
30

See Duff Wilson, Harvard Medical School in Ethics Quandry,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/03/business/03medschool.html?hp [perma.cc/BF2XUAMH].
31. See Financial Conflict of Interest Policy, HARVARD UNIV., http://vpr.harvard.edu/
pages/financial-conflict-interest-policy [perma.cc/PS9W-V737].
32. See Addressing Conflicts of Interest, HARVARD MAGAZINE (July–Aug. 2012),
http://harvardmagazine.com/2012/07/addressing-conflicts-of-interest
[perma.cc/32SKRSQA] (discussing revisions to the University’s policy).
33. See Daniele Fanelli, Do Pressures to Publish Increase Scientists’ Bias? An Empirical
Support from US States Data, 5 PLOS ONE e10271, 1, 4 (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.ncbi.
nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2858206/pdf/pone.0010271.pdf
[perma.cc/MB6K-QRJB];
see also Jeffrey M. Drazen, Editorial, Believe the Data, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1152, 1152
(2012) (noting that non-financial incentives include “academic promotion and recognition . .
. to ensure that their studies change practice”); Bekelman et. al., supra note 6, at 463 (asserting that industry bias exacerbates publication bias against negative results in favor of positive results); cf. id. (discussing other forms of financial bias, such as receiving increased
royalties from requiring their own textbooks for courses).
34. See ROBIN FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF SCIENCE IN LAW 82–83, 85–87 (2009) (discussing various schools of legal thought, including Legal Realism, and the limitations on objectivity in the art of law); id. at 133–38 and accompanying notes 326–42 (discussing the
philosophy of science and limitations on the perfection of scientific knowledge).
35. See id. at 88–89 and accompanying notes 192–93 (noting that some discipline is imposed by the legal system’s requirement that one’s subjective reasoning — or desire
wrapped in reason — must gain acceptance from the rest of the legal community).
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squarely the issue of data disclosure. As these fields have recognized,
and as the broader scientific community has long understood, disclosure of the data necessary to replicate a particular research result is
important protection against spurious claims.36 In recent years, independent investigators who were given the opportunity to access and
reanalyze data underlying published results of clinical trials have challenged many of those results as invalid or incomplete.37 Citing these
independent studies, the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) recently recommended a norm of expeditious sharing of all clinical trial data necessary to support results in a publication.38 While the IOM
recommendation focuses on clinical scientists, a 2003 report by the
National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) stresses the obligations of all
life scientists to make freely available “the data, algorithms, or other
information that is central or integral to the publication — that is,
whatever is necessary to support the major claims of the paper and
would enable one skilled in the art to verify or replicate the claims.”39
Additionally, according to the NAS, authors should provide data “in a
form on which other scientists can build with further research.”40
Since 2003, NIH has required researchers applying for more than
$500,000 in funding to submit a plan for data sharing.41
As for the social sciences, in 1995, prominent political scientist
Gary King enunciated a “replication standard.”42 Under this standard,
“sufficient information exists with which to understand, evaluate, and
build upon a prior work if a third party could replicate the results
without any additional information from the author.”43 With the rise
of empirical legal studies, including empirical studies of intellectual
property, the replication standard has become relevant for a significant subset of IP scholarship as well.

36. See, e.g., Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights
and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77, 90–91 (1999) (discussing that the communalism norm of the scientific ethos generally takes a negative view of secrecy).
37
. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SHARING CLINICAL TRIAL DATA: MAXIMIZING
BENEFITS, MINIMIZING RISK (2015), http://www.nap.edu/read/18998/chapter/1 [perma.cc/7LQE-KSY6].
38. Id. at . 80–82 (“Recommendation 1: Stakeholders in clinical trials should foster a culture in which data sharing is the expected norm, and should commit to responsible strategies
aimed at maximizing the benefits, minimizing the risks, and overcoming the challenges of
sharing clinical trial data for all parties.”).
39. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SHARING PUBLICATION-RELATED
DATA AND MATERIALS: RESPONSIBILITIES OF AUTHORSHIP IN THE LIFE SCIENCES 5 (2003),
http://www.nap.edu/read/10613/chapter/1 [perma.cc/PMH8-D82G].
40. Id. at 34.
41. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NOTICE NO. NOT-OD-03-032, FINAL NIH STATEMENT ON
SHARING RESEARCH DATA, (2003), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOTOD-03-032.html [perma.cc/D3EZ-WHCN].
42. Gary King, Replication, Replication, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 444, 444 (1995).
43. Id.
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NORMS FOR IP SCHOLARSHIP
With these considerations in mind, we urge legal scholars to
adopt a set of professional ethical norms governing disclosure, transparency, and conflicts of interest. These norms should serve to guide
the conduct of academics and other researchers, as well as to establish
benchmarks for future guidelines and standards. With these norms, we
seek to promote three related objectives. The first is transparency:
members of the academic community should disclose any monetary or
related inducements that might have the potential to influence scholarly research or create the perception that scholarly research has been
unduly influenced. The second is to reduce the potential for overt or
subconscious bias to affect scholarly research. Members of the academic community should seek wherever possible to minimize or eliminate outside influences that might inject bias or the appearance of
bias into research. The third is to facilitate replicability and examination of existing work by requiring, to the fullest extent possible, the
disclosure of the data underlying it.
We thus offer the following suggested professional norms, which
we hereby agree to adopt with respect to our own work. Similar norms
have been widely adopted throughout the life sciences and social sciences, in some cases by rule of the governing professional organizations or academic publishers. We believe that legal scholars should
abide by norms that are at least as stringent with respect to transparency and avoiding bias.
1. Research disclosure. We agree to disclose any sources of funding that contributed to the production of any given piece of research.
We will disclose that funding source when the work is submitted for
publication and on the work itself when the work is published or otherwise made publicly available. Contribution includes both payment
to the author for the production of a piece of research and money
spent to cover the costs of research assistance, data acquisition, and
the like.
2. General personal disclosure. We agree to disclose prominently, either on our faculty websites or in an equivalent venue, all sources
of funding we have received and all paid consulting or legal representation agreements we have made that are in any way relevant to our
research or concern the same subject matter as our research. This includes an ongoing consulting relationship with a law firm or company. Ongoing relationships include relationships where compensated
work has been completed but there is an expectation of future compensated work. This disclosure is required even if it does not directly
impact, or involve the funding of, any particular research project. A
general statement that a scholar receives money from various sources
is not sufficient to satisfy this disclosure obligation. However, no dis-
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closure is required if the amount of money involved is less than $1000
or if it constitutes only compensation for reasonable travel expenses.
It is also not necessary to disclose personal equity holdings or ownership stakes, although we note in our “Call for Action” that other institutions involved in legal academic governance may wish to explore
this issue.
We understand that in the course of legal practice or other types
of consulting arrangements the fact of representation of a particular
client may itself be confidential information for a time. The pledge is
not designed to prevent such representation or bar such confidentiality. But the fact of representation should be disclosed as soon as the
rules of practice permit, and if possible, the fact of representation
should be disclosed even when the client cannot be. In addition,
scholars should refrain from publishing academic work on the subject
of the representation until such disclosure is feasible.44
3. Institutional disclosure. We agree to disclose all sources of
funding for any institute, center, conference, clinic, or other institution
we direct or manage on that institution’s website. If there is more than
one source of funding, we agree to indicate which of the sources of
funding are major sources or represent a substantial share of the institution’s overall funding.
4. No quid pro quo. We agree to refrain from engaging in any research in which conclusions or outcomes are dictated by a third party
in exchange for funding. This does not prevent the preparation of
briefs, legal memos, or white papers on behalf of clients, but any such
document should make clear that the author is acting as an advocate
and not an academic in preparing that document.
5. No prior approval. We agree to refrain from engaging in any
research where a third party will have the right to approve or disapprove of the research before it is made public, except in order to protect the privacy or confidentiality of one or more individuals.
6. Data disclosure and replication. Consistent with applicable
rules governing human subjects protection, we agree to strive for replicability of our published empirical research. Ideally, data needed to
replicate the results in a published empirical paper should be made
accessible to other academics at the time the paper is published. If the
data set needed to replicate the results in a published paper cannot be
44. We intend for the phrase “on the subject of the representation” to be interpreted
broadly. For instance, if a faculty member were currently employed by a client to represent
the client in making an argument regarding patent validity under § 101 of the Patent Act,
that faculty member should not publish academic work on any aspect of § 101 doctrine that
is relevant to the case until the representation can be disclosed or until it has concluded.
However, the faculty member would remain free to publish academic work on other aspects
of patent law.

No. 2]

Open Letter on Ethical Norms in IP Scholarship

11

made available, but the database from which the data set was derived
is accessible to other academic researchers, we agree to describe in
detail how replication can be accomplished by these researchers. We
further agree to disclose any other materials necessary to replicate
research findings, including formulae and other algorithms.
We consider the use of data accessible to other academics (facilitating replicability) to be a best practice that academics should engage
in whenever possible. However, we realize that in some cases it may
be impossible to obtain data without providing for nondisclosure beyond standard measures used to protect the identities of human subjects. Accordingly, we do not believe it is a violation of ethical norms
to publish a paper that relies on data that is unavailable to other academics and cannot be replicated, but that fact should be disclosed in
the paper itself.
7. Collegiality and open inquiry. We agree to remain open to arguments on all sides and engage in discussion using language and
logic appropriate to the highest ethical standards of academic discourse and inquiry.
8. Dispersed institutional funding. We believe as an aspirational
matter that it would be preferable if no center, institute, or program
received a substantial share of its funding from a single source or
from a multiplicity of sources whose preferences align on any significant issue of law or policy. Rather, it would be preferable if institutions received funding from a diversified group of sources whose
preferences did not coincide, or at least from multiple sources with
contrasting preferences. We recognize that this may be difficult or
impossible for some institutions, particularly newer ones, and so we
describe it as an aspirational goal rather than recommending that it be
adopted immediately as a practical norm.
As a general matter, all donors should be identified. We recognize
that in certain circumstances, individual donors may wish to remain
anonymous in order to keep the extent of their giving capacity private.
The best practice would be to avoid this. If that is impossible, anonymous donations should never be used for any other reason, such as
masking a donor’s interest in the topic or avoiding the potential implications for conflicts of interest. Corporate, foundation, and industry
group donors should be identified under all circumstances.

CALL FOR ACTION
We consider this to be the beginning of a conversation and recognize that, even with these general guidelines, there is much work to be
done. We urge all institutions involved in legal academic governance — including the American Bar Association, American Association of Law Schools, and others — to help develop and adopt these
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and other ethical norms for the field. In particular, we urge those institutions to aid in the creation of more detailed guidelines that expand
upon the principles we have enunciated here, as well as exploring additional topics, such as personal equity holdings or ownership stakes.
Conferences of academics, such as the Intellectual Property Scholars
Conference or other groupings, could also be helpful in establishing
careful governance processes so that our field can maintain and
strengthen its formal ethical norms.
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